Scholarly
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Divided Korea
Why has the division of Korea persisted when virtually all other Cold War conflicts have ended?
Introduction
The Korean peninsula is one of this planet’s hot spots at the moment after North Korean threats of a nuclear weapons program and a strategic harassing of an American reconnaissance aircraft. The world looks to see what the near future will decide as to the fate of U.S.—North Korea relations as well as North—South Korea relations. Some of the earlier optimism for the gradual healing of the ideological and political chasm between North and South Korea is now uncertain. There are several important factors which cause the situation on the Korean peninsula to be tenuous making it difficult to predict its near future. The main obstacle to predicting the Korea situation is the uncertainty of North Korea itself. North Korea operates under the firm principle of juche, a Korean term for self reliance, adding to its appearance to the west as a highly secretive and politically unstable state. International and regional actors shape the possibility for Korea’s reunification because reunification would have serious consequences for the region. It has recently become even more difficult to forecast the future of Korean reunification until the current crisis is resolved and yields a new dynamic on the international scene. The role of the great powers established and perpetuated the division in Korea. When the great powers stop perpetuating Korea’s division, Korea will be able to move more swiftly towards and ultimately obtain reunification.
Cold War legacy
In placing the division of Korea in a Cold War context, analyzing the parameters of the Cold War and where and how it was perpetuated is useful in understanding why North and South Korea remain divided after all other divisions have ceased. The arms race fueled the Cold War which split the world after the two ideological camps, the communist-Marxist Soviet Union and the democratic-liberal United States, could not decide what to do with Germany and Korea.[1]. Germany and Korea were both states in which the great powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had temporarily imposed a boundary and a provincial government after World War II not resolving the disputes between themselves as to how they would deal with Germany and Korea. The boundaries continued until the indecision of the great powers made what became the status quo to be a more permanent boundary. Germany was divided east and west and Korea was divided north and south. Yet Germany is reunited, the Cold War is ended in Europe while Korea remains divided with China and North Korea still communist bastions in the Asia Pacific.
The divisions in both Germany and Korea were set up and maintained by the major powers. Germany had been the aggressor in Europe during World War II and thus the major powers felt there was a need to occupy and subdue their war enemy. Korea, on the other hand, had not been the aggressor. Conversely Korea had been the victim of aggression during World War II. Japan occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945. After 1945 the Soviet Union occupied the north and indoctrinated it with Stalinist communism which became the guiding principle for the new North Korean state under Kim Il Sung in 1948. Korea had a more rooted national identity than Germany with a longer history of unity which may have influenced the two states to handle their attempts at reunification differently.
In 1950 North Korea challenged the demarcation lines of divided Korea and tried to take the south by force but after three years was unsuccessful. The war caused much grief and a lot of blood shed. A fierce war for unity led to deeper division than in Germany, with families torn apart, unable even to communicate with each other, and with no remnants of cultural or economic ties. Hope for unification, therefore, had to be maintained even when the policies of the big powers compelled their leaders to initiate steps toward a lessening of tension.[2] The great powers wanted the Koreans to accept the division while the Koreans had proved their ardent desire for reunification through great loss. The Koreans were slower than the Germans during this same period of time to recognize each other as separate political entities. The Germans realized that the sluggishness of the great powers to change the status quo, perpetuating Germany’s division caused the Germans on both sides of the Berlin wall to make overtures for a gradual relaxing of tensions between east and west long before the Koreans attempted this same process.[3] The forecast for the successful easing of tensions between the two Germanys was when each entered the UN as separate states in 1973. It took seventeen more years after Germany’s entrance into the United Nations for its reunification on October 3, 1990. North and South Korea did not join the UN as separate states until 1991. Only recently in 1998 the South inaugurated a new doctrine for dealing with North Korea labeled the ‘Sunshine Policy’. Kim Dae-jung who articulated this policy announced three principles for dealing with North Korea. The first was to not undermine or assimilate North Korea. The second was to reconcile and cooperate with the North. The third was to not tolerate military provocation.[4] Unfortunately North Korea has been rather provocative in recent weeks which means that the gradual easing of tensions may be disturbed as South Korea finds itself caught between the United States, whose bases are located on South Korean soil, and its neighbor to the north whose policy is highly secretive and unpredictable.
Another important factor in Germany’s speedier reunification happened after China became a nuclear power by testing its first atomic bomb in 1964. Where China had once been an ally for the communist Soviet Union, the Soviets now feared a possible Chinese threat as relations became more tenuous between them. With the growing Chinese power, the Soviet Union sought to ease tensions in Europe in anticipation of a greater Chinese threat on its eastern border. Germany slowly came out from under the thumb of big power dynamics and could, therefore, maneuver its reunification more easily.[5] Korea, on the other hand, located at the border of China became a strategic center in the Pacific defense for both the Soviet Union and the United States. North Korea offered a buffer zone between the two powers whose careful playing of what became known as the ‘China card’ would likely shift the power balance in their favor. The great powers were thus even more interested in keeping Korea divided.
Germany reunited in 1989 in a relaxed political climate forty-four years after World War II had ended. West Germany by that time had an invigorated democratic structure, the old war generation had largely retired, and communism in the Soviet Union was showing signs of disintegration. The large powers did not face the same enemies they had faced at the end of the war and Germany was no longer an aggressive state having been subdued by the major powers. Perpetuating Germany’s division no longer seemed relevant in that political context for the big powers. In Asia, however, Japan had been the aggressor during World War II. Japan was the state to inherit a major power’s suppression and control but it was different from Germany in that the Soviet Union did not get involved. Japan, therefore, has had a special relationship with the United States articulated best in their security treaty. South Korea is the third most important security concern for the United States. The first concern for US security is its relations with China. The second concern is the US’s firm commitment to Japan and its security. Thirdly, the US seeks to maintain South Korea to protect against communist infiltration of the South and maintain a wider security perimeter. Because of South Korea’s status as third priority in the US security agenda, South Korea’s political situation must not affect the US relationship with China or Japan adversely without affecting its own alliance with the great power. South Korean policy is therefore, very much influenced by US objectives in the region as well as an unstable and unpredictable North Korean leadership. It is interesting to note the fervor with which the South Koreans look toward reunification despite the difficult odds. South Korea has been more willing in the recent past (before the North Korean nuclear crisis became a possible threat) to risk the U.S.—South Korea alliance and unify with their North Korean neighbors. Growing unrest for the presence of US military bases has led to demonstrations. Perhaps this tendency for resilience to big power domination is due to the historical friction caused by Chinese and Japanese aggression. Korea is a nation who, accustomed to aggressive states around them, has learned resilience.
Complications for Reunification
When faced with daunting obstacles to change, maintaining the status quo is easier than change. The reunification of North and South Korea is daunting. Although the Korean impulse to reunite is great there remain serious obstacles to the achievement of that end. South Korea extended its Sunshine Policy toward North Korea subscribing to a positive relationship with North Korea through mutual respect for each other’s authority and internal policy. This was a huge step forward from the past claims that only one government had the legitimate power over the peninsula. But, although mutual recognition is a significant breakthrough in political acceptance of each other’s sovereignty, it only begins to touch the surface of the more complex regional and international issues of reunification which a Korean friendship across borders will not solve. Some have perceived North Korea’s taking advantage of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy.In South Korea, North Korea not only has found a leader who has committed his entire administration to improving relations, but also has an economically vibrant country willing to pour billions of dollars into the North even if the chance of making profits is remote.[6] The obstacles to reunification are similar for any states attempting to merge with another state. The problems range from how to deal with integrating the two political systems, the problem of how to deal with the severe economic disparity between north and south, overcoming fundamental ideological differences, affects on regional security, and possible negative international pressure from states such as the United States, China, and Japan. Integrating the economy will provide a particular challenge to Korean unification because of the severe gap between north and south. The gap between the north and south far exceeds that found in Germany at reunification. Because North Korea has spent its money on military power, the North Korean people are starving. The result of an integrated economy with the south will be a severely weakened currency and economic instability which will have serious ripple affects in the region as well as in South Korea. Regional security would also change. Korea could not be a buffer zone between China and the United States. A unified Korea would have to decide which ally to court, the US or China. Troops would no longer be safely separated by North Korea. Either way the security balance would change at the particularly sensitive point of US-China relations. This change in regional security is unsurprisingly not favored by either the Chinese or the United States. Ideologically the United States would find it difficult to come out openly against Korean unification but would also not likely openly support reunification either. A weakened Korea dealing with the transition of reunification, would be vulnerable to this shifting regional security.
Nuclear Proliferation
Korea’s announcement of a nuclear weapons program in October 2002 not only violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which the North Koreans had once been members but it also went against the Agreed Framework signed in 1994 with South Korea, Japan, and the United States once again establishing their commitment to non-proliferation. This undoubtedly has disturbed the optimism South Koreans had in their quest for reunification. First, the Sunshine Policy only tolerates North Korea until in the case of armed provocation. Second, and possibly more importantly, the Agreed Framework has been broken. As mentioned earlier, although much of North Korean government is shrouded in secrecy, there is one policy which North Korea has made clear. The North Korean government directs most of its money toward military build-up even while its people starve. When the situation of the people becomes desperate, North Korea plays a game with the international community and specifically the United States to get oil and food supplies for its people. North Korea has repeatedly used this approach with the United States to comply with nuclear weapons treaties in exchange for food and supplies. Each time the North Koreans have threatened to build up their nuclear weapons program and each time they have worked out a way to get what they want from the international community. This time, however, is different. The North Koreans have announced their nuclear weapons program at a tense time when the world is focusing on Iraq’s violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and cleaning up after a war. The North Koreans have also provoked a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft as well. The tension is higher and the risks are greater in North Korea’s flirtations in the nuclear power arena. South Korea is caught in the middle of the tension between the United States and Korea because the South Koreans have the U.S. bases on their soil. Whether or not there is a war in Korea, there remains one serious issue. North Korea is at the brink of obtaining nuclear weapons with a program to create more. The nuclear weapon card further changes the dynamic of East Asia and also the international community. With nuclear weapons and the threat that they will use them, North Korea automatically gains a more prominent role in international affairs. Then if we throw in the question of reunification with South Korea some time in the future the question of unification also becomes more complicated.If North and South Korea reunify sometime in the future, that will mean that the whole of Korea will be a nuclear state. South Korea will have attained nuclear weapons easily through reunification. This is a serious issue considering that Japan is not a nuclear power and is a historical adversary with both Korea and China, both of which would have become nuclear powers. As the role of the United States in the Asia Pacific changes with the reunification in Korea and the future for U.S.—Japanese relations becomes less reliable, Japan will be faced with an enormous dilemma. They will have to choose between remaining unarmed and unsure of America’s continuing support or arm and even face the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. With the United States lean toward courting the Chinese in recent decades, it will be hard to predict to what length the United States will defend Japan especially if there is no longer the Korean buffer zone. The U.S. may opt to take a more hands-off approach because of the uncertainty of important U.S. relationships such as China and Korea. Although the tension between Japan and Korea seem to be the most tenuous if Korea were to unite and become a nuclear power, relations with China may also cause a serious problem in nuclear strategy. China is a very small nuclear power. A communist Korea with nuclear power may not be as serious as a Korean democratic nuclear power would be to China. The serious consequences of North Korea’s proliferation in the region will cause the states around it to be even more reticent to support a unified Korea. China is worried it will lose influence on the peninsula. The Russians, before North Korea’s nuclear capability was even announced, had already expressed fears that if the Agreed Framework of 1994 breaks down, Japan will be forced to acquire nuclear weapons.[7] There are many variables which reunification would create which may not be in the favor of the large players in the region. The international community is likely to support the status quo including the suppression of North Korea’s nuclear power in order to avoid serious consequences in regional and possibly international security.
Conclusion
Germany’s Cold War division was established and maintained largely because of the conflict between the major powers namely the Soviet Union and the United States. After China became a nuclear power in 1964, the Soviet Union put more of its energies into its eastern border giving Germany room to move toward unification. When the interest in perpetuating the Cold War in Europe slowly evaporated with Soviet disinterest and disintegration, Germany was able to reunite. In Korea the effect of Chinese nuclear power status created a situation where the super powers, the US and the USSR became more interested in maintaining the division of Korea as a buffer zone in the battle for the China card.
Korean desire for reunification is strong. North Korea has fought a devastating war to reclaim its southern neighbor and neither side was able to give each other mutual recognition until long after the Germans had already begun the process. South Korea had initially inaugurated the Sunshine Policy to heal the wounds between north and south even spending much of its resources on North Korea without significant returns and possibly disturbing the US alliance.
There are many obstacles to reunification economically, politically, not to mention the regional consequences but many of these obstacles are common to any integration process. The Korean desire for reunification seems to be stronger than the obstacles which it would face in integration and security. There is one major setback to reunification. North Korea’s nuclear proliferation takes the stakes to a boiling point in regional stability. The international community would try to prevent reunification to prevent the situation from getting any worse than it already is for regional security. North Korea must be disarmed, its nuclear program dissembled or the North Korea threat may cause specifically Japan to be forced to arm as well. Already the stakes are high. Reunification would make them worse.
The major setback to Korean unification are the regional powers including the US super power does not want Korea to reunite because of its upset to regional security. As we have seen with Germany and in the perpetuation of divided Korea even despite a war fought for reunification on the peninsula, the major powers ultimately can prevent reunification. When the great powers lose interest or sanction the reunification of Korea, it will be much easier for Korea to unite. The crisis in Korea right now may change the dynamic if North Korea becomes more predictable, however. In the age of nuclear proliferation, the dynamic that the super powers have control over the little powers may change.
Separating Threats and Use of Force
The threat of force and the actual use of force can be separated. Threats are a type of coercion. Threats imply a negative intent which in some way endangers a target. A threat of force, however, falls short of the use of force. It is inherently part of a chain which leads to something else although it may or may not lead to the actual use of force. Whether or not there is an actual use of force, the threat of force has the potential to cause the same amount of international insecurity as an actual use of force.[1] Threats of force are not limited to state actors only. They can come from terrorist groups, domestic sources such as rebel groups, civil disobedience actions, military leaders not acting in accordance with political leaders (war lords), and much more. Rosalyn Higgins defines threats of force as actions which fall short of the UN definition of use of force, for example, “border incidents”, “coercion used to effect or block governmental changes”, and “violent acquisition of territory”.[2]
The term force has various meanings. Over the years conventions have had a difficult time agreeing on the meaning of force. For example, the UN Special Committee on Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (SCPPC) in Mexico City in 1964 could not come up with a consensus definition as to whether or not force included other forms of pressure including political and economic pressures as well as armed agression. The Committee again reexamined this issue in 1967 in Geneva without consensus whether or not the definition should also include political propaganda as a possible use of force. In 1972 the UN General Assembly finally made a broad statement deciding that the threat and use of force were prohibited in all its forms including political, economic coercion, or the threat of using nuclear weapons.[3]
An attempt at a definition of threat can not presume to be all inclusive but can raise interesting questions about the importance and position of threats in international relations. If we are to separate threats from the use of force, we must also distinguish threats from diplomacy. Threats can be characterized as a type of force in the sense that was discussed above and because a threat involves some form of coercion. Threats are an integral part of diplomacy. It is impossible to separate threats from diplomacy. Threats are the part of diplomacy that endangers international peace and security and are, therefore, included under the UN Charter as an illegal act. However, for the purposes of enforcing the UN Charter, it is important to make a legal distinction between which threats are illicit and which are permitted. Those threats that are permitted would fall under the umbrella of legal diplomacy. Those that are not permitted would fall under the umbrella of illegal threats which should be dealt with by the Security Council. Therefore, in enforcing the prohibition against “threat and use of force” illegal threats would be isolated from diplomacy although the definitions of threat, use of force, and diplomacy would remain flexible.
Threats that deserve the attention of the international community and specifically the Security Council and the International Court of Justice must be serious in nature. Rosalyn Higgins distinguishes between an intention and an actuality of force. A threat therefore could arguably fall under the intention to use force.[4] Intentions, however, are difficult to calculate. In order for threats to be recognized in international legal dialogue, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is an important guide in defining and isolating threats. It reads:All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.[5] If the threat of force is isolated in this context, the threat of force would need to threaten “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” or be “inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. The Charter framework for threat of force is broad. Rosalyn Higgins emphasized the relative degree to which a threat is given in determining whether or not the threat is licit.[T]here are strong grounds for arguing that the traditional term ‘use of force’ must also be taken to cover ideological and diplomatic methods when these are employed in a very high degree and aimed at impairing the territorial integrity or political independence of a State—though these latter words, as they appear in Article 2(4), are governed by the phrase ‘threat or use of force’.[6] It is assumed that this kind of threat would have serious, dire, and even without the potential use of force cause a breach to international peace and security. This urgency or sense of dire must exist in a UN Charter definition of threat to separate it from normal everyday diplomacy. What should the definition of a threat of force not include? It is important to maintain normal relations between states. Sometimes states act outside of the each other’s best interests which is why the international system is often described as chaotic. In regulating threats of force it is not necessary to alter the entire framework of these normal chaotic relations. Trying to alter the entire framework of relations between states would be idealistic and unnecessary because changing the system also causes other problems of enforcement and feasibility. The need, however, as the framers of the UN Charter envisaged, is control over the seriously damaging effects of threats of force which alter the stability of the international community. Threats are inherently sequential. A threat is not in itself the danger. The danger is in the sequence of events that may or may not follow. In a study of threat science Gerald Hopple, Paul Rossa, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld discussed the essential characteristics of a threat.
There are certain base conditions. Events and sequences create recognition of the threat which finally leads to a crisis. Without recognition of a possible threat the events and sequences will seem like the status quo and the threat will not exist.[7] When a threat is recognized a “threat burden” is created. A “threat burden” is defined as the “’load’ on a decision system”.[8] Threats in the international system can occur from in and outside of a state.[9] They further emphasize that, “mechanistic stimulus-response and automatic spillover models rarely hold. Reality is much more complex.”[10]
In other words, there are no easy formulas for determining if there is a threat and whether or not the aggressor state will carry out that threat and whether or not there is an internal threat affecting outward behavior. The international system is much to complex to be relegated to a simple definition of threat.
As noted above, a threat must be recognized or perceived. Without recognition of the threat, it will not cause an impending crisis. Therefore, recognition is essential to the element of coercion that creates instability in the target state and be a problem that the international community can address. Because of the inherent need for the target state to recognize a threat in order for it to constitute one, there are value judgments. Each state will perceive a threat differently based upon its values. It is possible, then, for a state to perceive a threat that the aggressor state did not actually intend or realize. The study uses the example of research done in the concept of equity. In the United States the black community valued equity more than the white community who still felt equity was important but not as high of a priority. Because equity was a higher value to the black community, the black community accordingly was more sensitized to threats to their equity than the white community. The study also uses the example that the middle and working classes valued a clean, comfortable place to live more than the wealthier class and more easily perceived threats to their living conditions because they lacked this value although all classes generally valued clean and comfortable places to live. They conclude:Analogously, states which lack security (objectively and/or perceptually) would presumably rank certain types of values higher than countries which “possess” larger quantities of this precious and scarce commodity.[11] A state who values security at a higher degree than one who is relatively more secure would also more easily feel threatened with security concerns. This may explain the developing and unstable countries need to establish or recognize other forms of aggression and coercion besides military force because their security is threatened more easily by these types of aggression. Strong western countries such as the United States and Great Britain may not perceive these types of aggression as threats because they themselves are relatively secure in that area. Nuclear weapons and terrorism issues would more likely threaten powerful and more militarily secure nations, if we apply the threat theory mentioned above because security in those areas are weaker and thus are a higher priority or value to them.
The Hopple, Rossa, Wilkenfeld study continuously emphasizes the complexity of trying to analyze threats. It would be unwise, just as it has been in the case with the concept of aggression, to strictly define a threat. They quote K. Boulding:To make a science of threats…is to threaten the threat system itself, for a system so inefficient in producing welfare as the threat system is can only survive as long as it is supported on folk ignorance. It is little wonder, therefore, that the science of threat systems has been so slow to develop.[12] Although Boulding recognizes the difficulties in dealing with complexities of threat, he does recognize its development, albeit slow. The concept of threat of force must act in the international system as an important danger to international peace and security similar to the status of the concept of aggression which is also complex and difficult to define.
How Threats Work in the International System
A threat can be verbal or non-verbal. Verbal threats in this sense are those that are discussed openly. China’s verbal threat:
If things develop to a stage that forces us to take those measures we don’t want to, we will absolutely not hesitate …If it should ever unfortunately, come to a military confrontation between the two sides (China and Taiwan), the P.L.A. must take decisive measures and end that unfortunate situation in the shortest time.[13]
This is an example of an open verbalized threat. An example of a non-verbalized threat is when China amassed conducted military exercises dangerously near Taiwan’s borders with implied anger over Taiwanese actions. Without stating the threat, Taiwan felt the threat of a possible Chinese attack just as the United States felt threatened when the Soviet Union pointed nuclear missiles towards it from Cuba. In both examples the states in question were at odds and had previously demonstrated serious animosity. Carrying out these threats could have been detrimental to either or both the territorial integrity and political independence of the target state.A threat must endanger international peace and security or the territorial integrity and political independence of a state. There are many ways and many definitions of what constitutes an endangerment of international peace and security, territorial integrity, and political independence. Although there are many types of threats, this analysis is limited to the discussion of threats of force. A threat of force can cause a myriad of different problems within a state including economic, political, territorial, and so forth. The threat of force therefore is not an automatic cause and effect sequence. The effects of a threat of force could be many fold. Ramona Sadurska also
Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a loose term to cover a wide variety of relations between states. Threats of force and even the use of force which are state-to-state relations are also included in diplomacy. However, in order to maintain international peace and security, international law regulates the threat and use of force. Because the threat of force is slightly vague, it is important to distinguish the threat of force from other negative or dangerous forms of diplomacy. For example, subversion is another negative form of diplomacy which could potentially undermine international peace and security. Subversion could be considered a type of threat of force under international law but it may fall just outside of the Charter’s jurisdiction. Arguably, the Security Council and the International Criminal Court could deal with subversion on a case by case basis. Subversion is a good example of type of negative diplomacy which could help to draw a perimeter on what kind of diplomacy should and should not be included under the jurisdiction of international law. F.S. Northedge defines subversion.[Subversion] is the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the target-state, and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor.[14] According to Northedge infiltration and disintegration are stages which precede the subversion process. Each of which are progressive stages to the further undermining of a target-state. Presumably, if subversion were to be characterized as illegal, a line must be drawn between one of the progressive stages. The more serious side of the line would be considered an illegal threat of force. Ramona Sadurska explores how to deduce these types of threats.[A] threat can be deduced from certain positive actions (for instance, moving army units into proximity with the target audience, engaging in military maneuvers, increasing a military budget, or deploying certain weapons) and even from the threatener’s failure to take such actions.[15] An illegal threat is difficult to determine. It is also difficult for the Security Council to decide whether or not these threats should be censured because of the two-sided nature of threats. Sadurska states:[The] threatener and a target audience [are] mutually influencing one another. …[Coercion] is an ongoing process precariously balanced between maintenance and destruction of social processes and values.[16] The aggressor influences the target by issuing a threat and the target influences the aggressor by recognition and response to the threat. Threats also, as was discussed earlier vary in degree and complexity. Threats affect states differently, states react differently, and states use threats in varying degrees of aggression and type. Some threats would be acceptable as a normal part of diplomacy and others would endanger international peace and security. Because of this precarious balance between acceptable and non-acceptable threats, the Security Council would find it difficult to ensure perfect justice.
Without a perfect system of enforcing against threats of force, it is still vital to bring threats of force into the larger international legal framework. As was stated earlier, threats can be just as serious if not more serious than the actual use of force in disrupting international peace and security or threatening territorial integrity and political independence. States in many ways tend to need a broader reach of the current international law to deal with the problems of the modern world. Separating threats of force from the use of force places threats of force a notch above “bad behavior” but also recognizes that threats of force tend to take a slightly less damaging role in international relations.
aud'acious 
